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ABSTRACT

LEAN FIRE MANAGEMENT: A FOCUSED ANALYSIS OF THE INCIDENT
COMMAND SYSTEM BASED ON TOYOTA PRODUCTION SYSTEM
PRINCIPLES.

A primary role of the Incident Command System is to learn from past incidents,
as illustrated by its origins in the wildland firefighting community. Successful emergency
response operations under the Incident Command System has prompted its nationwide
spread, this promulgation critically relies on the system’s capability to stabilize and
continuously improve various aspects of emergency response through effective
organizational learning. The objective of this study is to evaluate the potential to apply
fundamental principles of the Toyota Production System (Lean manufacturing) to
improve learning effectiveness within the Incident Command System. An in-depth
review of literature and training documents regarding both systems revealed common
goals and functional similarities, including the importance of continuous improvement.
While these similarities point to the validity of applying Lean principles to the Incident
Command System, a focus on the systematic learning function of the Incident Command
System culminated in the discovery of gaps in approaches proposed by the Incident
Command System framework. As a result, recommendations are made for adjustments in
systematic problem solving to adapt Lean principles of root cause analysis and emphasis
on standardization of successful countermeasures to benefit the system. Future
recommendations are also proposed based on the author’s understanding of the system.

KEYWORDS: Incident Command System, Fire Management, Lean Manufacturing,
Toyota Production System, Lean Systems Program
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.0

Purpose of Thesis
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the potential to apply fundamental principles

of Lean Manufacturing to facilitate continuous improvements for users of the Incident
Command System (ICS). The Incident Command System is instrumental in driving the
management of all incidents, large or small, including human and lightning caused
wildfires in forests, grasslands, and preserved or monitored areas of the United States
(hereinafter referred to as “wildland fires”). The term “Lean Manufacturing” indicates
that operational methods based on Toyota Production System (TPS) principles are in
place within some model area of, or throughout the entirety of, an organization.
Key references were used throughout this thesis in order to compare the Incident
Command System with a successful Lean manufacturing management system as an effort
to analyze possible gaps between the two. This approach revealed encouraging
similarities while also illustrating differences between the two systems and justifications
for why they are as such. This analysis and reasoning was formulated through an
understanding of what each system intends to achieve through the work they do at the
level closest to production of a product or service. Furthermore, the intent of this thesis
was not to redefine the direct work done in the production of these products or services.
1.1

Introduction
Though beautiful in many regards, Mother Nature is capable of many awe-

inspiring processes that can result in the destruction of property or loss of human life. The
rage exhibited by an earthquake can tear apart homes, scarring the people involved, as
1

well as leaving scars on the very earth itself. Similarly, hurricanes can approach quickly
and devastate high density populations while spreading disruptive weather patterns
throughout wide regions of surrounding areas. Those same severe storms blow across the
land relentlessly, capable of producing deadly tornadoes or lightning that endanger the
people in their paths.
Fire is another phenomenon that deserves to be added to this list. The inevitability
of fire occurrence in our lives has prompted dedicated annual seasons where precautions
are taken and emphasized publically in hopes of reducing the frequency and severity of
incidents. Also, fire can occur post-incidentally from any one of these events, or can be
started due to human influence. In some cases, fire can be beneficial to the local
ecosystem [1], whereas in other cases fire is completely and totally unwanted. For either
case, it is important that we understand fire in depth so our communities can be prepared
when incidents occur.
1.2

United States Fire Statistics
The statistical estimates referenced in the following section are used to illustrate a

very broad topic, the effects of fire in the United States. As such, it was important to
gather a complete set of data published in 2011 in order to present a more wholistic view
of the situation. The most current and comprehensive reports are produced by the
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), and the most recent nationwide cost
estimate for overall fire impact was published in late 2014 using data concerning 2011.
This 3 year gap is indicative of the time it takes to gather, process, and interpret all the
data that factors into this complex estimate for these reports. However, the use of 2011
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data here should present an important illustration of the impact that fire has had in the
United States. Furthermore, these NFPA statistics were published with the same intent of
providing a very high level depiction, and these numbers are said to have a broad
uncertainty while giving a reasonable idea of the major role that fire plays in our
economy [2].
The impact of fire on the United States is tremendous, and it reaches well beyond
suppression costs and property damage. The National Fire Protection Association
estimated total fire costs in the United States to be $329 billion in 2011, which was
equivalent to 2.1% of the 2011 U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) [2]. Figure 1
illustrates the estimated total costs for fire in the United States from the year 2000
through 2011 based on these NFPA statistics [2].

Figure 1: Estimated total cost of fire in the U.S. (2000-2011) [2].
When looking at these overall cost estimates, it’s worth noting that the total cost
of fire in 2011 was higher than that of 2001, when major catastrophic damage and losses
were suffered on September 11, 2001. Figure 1 also shows the total cost for 2001
3

excluding the estimated costs related to the events of 9/11 to illustrate $60 billion of
losses from incidents related. If this cost were incurred in 2011, with inflation taken into
consideration, it’s easy to see the total cost of fire reaching nearly $400 billion dollars in
a single year. The contributing factors to the total cost of fire in 2011 were broken down
in NFPA reports [2], and for clarity these categories are visualized in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Breakdown of estimated total cost of fire in U.S. for 2011 [2].
The highest cost in the breakdown is attributed to volunteer firefighters, but this estimate
illustrates savings based on the monetary value added by the volunteers providing their
services for little to no compensation [2] [3]. It must also be noted that in the “Third
Needs Assessment for the United States,” published in 2011, the NFPA estimated 71% of
the nation’s fire departments in 2010 were classified as volunteer departments [4]. The
second highest cost actually incurred by fire services according to this breakdown is the
expenditures of local career fire departments. If the volunteer contributions are combined
with the career contributions, this would give a total proposed firefighter expenditure of
$182.1 billion in the United States. The estimated expenditures from the reports included
4

calls answered with no incident, emergency medical services, as well as fire prevention,
monitoring, mitigation, suppression, and other activities that must be undertaken in order
to protect the public from incidents [2].
According to the NFPA estimate, these costs are a direct result of around 1.38
million fires that occurred in 2011, where 17,500 civilians and 70,090 firefighter injuries
resulted [5] [6]. Furthermore, within these incidents, 3,005 civilians and 61 firefighters
lost their lives [5] [6] [7]. A note in Karter’s NFPA report regarding injuries and losses
resulting from fire states that, “the term ‘civilian’ includes anyone other than a firefighter,
and covers public service personnel such as police officers, civil defense staff, non-fire
service medical personnel, and utility company employees” [5].
As a subset of these 1.38 million fires, the NFPA also estimated that 338,000 of
these were fires related to “brush, grass, or wildland fires” [5]. Wildland fire statistics
from the National Interagency Fire Coordination Center (NIFC), strictly regarding federal
suppression and associated costs, indicated that 82,798 wildland fires occurred on private,
state, and federal land in 2011, including 8,672 prescribed fires [8]. Figure 3 shows that
the federal suppression costs for these fires from 2000 to 2011 varied between
approximately one to two billion U.S. dollars for private, state, and federal land
combined [8].

5

Figure 3: Federal Wildland Fire Suppression Costs (2000-2011) [8].
According to the figure, federal cost of wildland fire suppression for private, state, and
federal land has shown variation between $1 billion and $2 billion from 2000 to 2011 [8].
This variation alludes to the lack of predictability from year to year in planning for the
processes of wildland fire suppression. This is also reflective of the many factors that
contribute to wildland fire management.
Federal wildland fire suppression costs in 2011 reached $1.73 billion for the
suppression of the 82,798 fires considered [8]. The higher estimate of 338,000 brush,
grass, and wildland fires from the NFPA could be estimated to have cost around $7
billion, if it’s assumed that all incidents were exactly the same in severity and scope.
However, while this type of estimate may serve for a general perspective, it’s simply not
realistic to assume that any two incidents are exactly the same. Some aspects of incident
response will always vary with respect to resource requirements and availability, as well
as management approach. However, the estimated costs of fire clearly indicate that better
understanding of fire and the ability to better manage it are crucial going forward.
6

1.3

General Combustion Research
There have been great strides by researchers in trying to achieve a better

understanding of physical fire based phenomena, and this research has resulted in fire
being commonly utilized in today’s society. Combustion research has progressed enough
over the years to provide the internal combustion engine as well as sophisticated heating
and cooling equipment. Designers, maintenance personnel, and operators of these devices
have enough knowledge to safely control them, no matter that their power comes from
spark based ignitions and explosion based power generation. This illustrates the
knowledge and skill possessed by members of the research community to use
experimentation, fundamental theory, and computational methods to better understand
the thermodynamics, fluid dynamics, chemical kinetics, and transport mechanisms which
promote fire occurrence and behavior [9].
The abnormal occurrence of fire in our world has been researched just as
extensively. The justification is clearly associated with the costs associated as well as the
number of fatalities and injuries resulting from these incidents.
1.4

Wildland Fire Research
A great deal of effort has been contributed to researching wildland fire behavior

in an attempt to provide better understanding to the people who risk their own lives in
order to save others. This research begins fundamentally with the causes of ignition and
flame spread. Historically, radiative heat transfer had been accepted as the dominant
trigger for wildland fire ignition and flame spread. Therefore, radiation based ignition has
been studied extensively to better understand occurrences of wildland fire and develop
7

models for predictive purposes [10]. However, fire has been observed and explored to
discover a major role played by convective heat transfer, thus the exclusion of convection
also excluded a large part of the mechanics behind ignition theory and flame propagation
[9] [10]. These types of discoveries bring us ever closer to a solid definition of fire but
there is still a long road ahead before we fully understand it.
Ultimately, the firefighting community must continue to push forward and
respond to incidents as effectively and efficiently as possible. The drive for stable fire
protection and mitigation, along with the need for methods capable of improvement to
keep up with national trends, brings to light the importance of research into the overall
fire management system itself. Fortunately, at the basic foundational level in which it was
developed, the system strives to provide some clarity and stability to a fairly chaotic
profession.
1.5

Fire Management in the United States
Both urban and wildland fire management are heavily influenced by documents

and systems in place, which are intended to highlight the best method for approaching
fire-based incidents. These documents also take into consideration various factors. A list
of some well-known documents and systems can be seen in Figure 4. Each of these are
intended to guide firefighters and help keep the firefighting community consistent
through standard codes, regulations, and sharing of information.

8

Figure 4: Partial list of guiding documents and systems in place for fire management.
Regulation or codification of standards may come from entities such as the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), they may be published within the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), or they
may be presented as a subset of the National Incident Management System (NIMS)
framework. These codes and regulations typically include, but are not limited to
minimum requirements for safety, equipment, and training.
The Resource Management Plan (RMP) functions at a very high level as a
guideline for planning before or during incidents. These documents are important in
providing an understanding of geographical considerations and natural resources;
therefore RMPs will typically outline features such as Wildland Urban Interfaces (WUI),
mine shafts, watersheds, caves, and the like [11].

9

Fire Management Plans (FMP) are closer to the incident level but still operate at a
fairly high level with respect to the work being done. These documents are generally
required to follow guidelines of the Resource Management Plan, and outline additional
information regarding the situational awareness of an area to assist in planning for and
managing incidents [12]. Fire Management Plans are required for any area with burnable
vegetation; they are important documents because if no approved Fire Management Plan
exists for an area, then suppression is the only option for dealing with fires [12]. This is
undesirable for a number of reasons. Immediate suppression has been shown to
negatively affect fire dependent species while also preventing fuel level reduction in large
areas of the wildland, and the resulting buildup of fuel levels increases the risk of
catastrophic fires at a later time [1]. So it is clear that these documents assist managers in
making informed decisions through consideration of fuel levels and ecological
dependence on fire, while also focusing on public awareness of fire risks and
preparedness in order reduce the risk of catastrophic fire. Further importance of Fire
Management Plans stem from the fact that these are developed by people who are most
familiar with the area and may be the only incident management personnel permanently
associated with the area due to the nature of wildland fire crews moving between vastly
different geographical areas to address other incidents [13].
The above mentioned regulations and documents help to guide decisions based on
information external to what’s happening in the midst of an incident, and they do not
specifically address the exact approach taken or work methods required by an incident.
While there is no single answer to providing guidance for these two aspects of fire
management, the existence of the Incident Command System provides a solid repeatable
10

starting point for any incident by promoting clear roles and corresponding
responsibilities. Those responsibilities as well as proven approaches to past incidents are
outlined within Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that are developed by individual
agencies and incorporate the various regulations mentioned above [14].
1.6

Reasoning for Lean Fire Management
The main discussion in this thesis will cover the Incident Command System and

touch on its functional components, such as Standard Operating Procedures, as they
function within an overall emergency management framework. This focus on methods
and work done at the incident will lend itself nicely to a comparison with a Lean
organization and point to possible applications of Lean to the Incident Command System.

11

Figure 5

12
Figure 5: Primary commonalities between the two different systems of Lean manufacturing and fire
management. Operational feedback reflects system performance to drive problem solving and research
efforts. However, the quality and efficiency of these efforts rely heavily on the system’s ability to
communicate current conditions. The defining characteristic of a Lean manufacturing management
system is its ability to document and communicate this current condition in order to continuously
improve.

Figure 5 illustrates that these distinctly different systems share a common goal to
provide a product or service. The desire to continuously improve those products or
services provides a common drive for both systems to utilize problem solving and pursue
various research efforts. The research aspect of this usually promotes the following:
better understanding of fundamental physical properties important to the problem,
development of information technology to visualize and share information more
efficiently, and improvements/implementation of equipment to improve work
efficiency/methods. Last but definitely not least, improvements in operations and
management of the system itself can be achieved through this loop.
The efficiency of the improvement cycle in Figure 5, for any system, depends
highly on current and specific feedback with respect to key functions and processes of the
system. Feedback is extremely effective when taken from some form of stable standard
because it must provide visibility on current problems in order to properly prioritize
topics for research and problem solving [15]. In short, the quality of problems to be
solved or presented for research efforts is directly related to the level of understanding
that a system has of its capabilities, processes, and products or services with respect to
real-time situations. Lean manufacturing is well known to excel at providing this type of
feedback for problem solving when implemented properly [16]. Thus the flow of
feedback for a Lean system illustrated in Figure 5 is shown as complete to direct that
critical information towards the progression of overall continuous improvement.
Within such a broad fire management landscape, the Incident Command System
stands out as a focal point because of its importance in everyday fire management. The
Incident Command System exhibits the specific goal to promote effective management of
13

hazardous incidents to prevent property losses as well as loss of valuable lives on a day to
day basis. It accomplishes this by streamlining the overall decision making process to
effectively cope with all aspects of urgency associated with wildland fire, urban fire, or
any other hazardous incidents. For wildland fire-based incidents, the decision may be to
strictly monitor an incident or to fully extinguish it based on the guidance of the
aforementioned regulations and Fire Management Plans. The Incident Command System
originated in the 1970s, and has grown immensely over the past 44 years. Though when
considering the many generations of firefighters that have served in the United States
over the course of its history, the Incident Command System is a relatively new approach
to incident management.

14

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.0

The Incident Command System
The Incident Command System was developed in response to lessons learned

during past experiences. This progression can be seen in the timeline illustrated in Figure
6.

Figure 6: Timeline depicting the history of the Incident Command System.
In the fall of 1970, southern California suffered significant fires that burned over 500,000
acres, more than 700 structures, and caused 16 fatalities [17]. In response, the
FIRESCOPE program was developed as “the first practical application of systems design
to a major, complex wildland fire management operational problem” [18]. This statement
alone is grounds for an industrial or manufacturing engineer to approach this topic with
interest. The acronym FIRESCOPE referred to “FIrefighting REsources of Southern
California Organized for Potential Emergencies” and as the name suggests, the effort
encompassed support from various levels of California’s local, state, and federal response
community [18]. The FIRESCOPE team discovered that inefficient interagency
communications and unclear organizational structures within the fire management system
were regularly at fault during out of control incidents [18]. As such, the schematic
15

illustrated in Figure 7 was discussed in Richard A. Chase’s technical document regarding
FIRESCOPE, and outlines the complicated method of communicating needs related to
fire management before FIRESCOPE set out to improve this.

(Figure from Chase, 1980)

Figure 7: Communication for Fire Management before FIRESCOPE. Illustrates
complexity of coordination between multiple agencies before the FIRESCOPE project.
Schematic developed and discussed by Richard A. Chase in the foundational technical
report outlining a new approach [18].

Chase states that in this system each individual agency had to seek out support or
approval individually amongst multiple agencies in order to ensure mutual aid if incidents
were severe enough to warrant multiple agencies for control [18].

16

Figure 8: A simplified schematic of the Multiagency Coordination System Proposed by
FIRESCOPE. Illustration based on the original schematic discussed within the Chase
technical report [18].

Figure 8 illustrates a simplified interpretation of the solution that FIRESCOPE
proposed in the Chase technical document, known as the Multiagency Coordination
System (MACS). This system illustrates a centralized information center that helps to
coordinate and communicate needs during an incident [18]. This concept alone was a
major improvement at the time, but the FIRESCOPE proposal did not end there. The
Incident Command System was developed to compliment this concept and maintain this
same level of coordination and clear communication at the incident level to provide
consistent clarity for all levels of involvement with the incident [18].
To achieve the level of clarity required for coordination and efficient
communication, the Incident Command System places emphasis on a dynamic
17

organizational structure based on clear roles and standardized terminology [19] [20]. The
organizational structure exhibits flexibility during an incident to adjust personnel
deployments based on incident severity [20]. Furthermore, a standardized planning
process is in place to control adjustments in personnel, plan to meet the objectives of each
incident, and determine future management efforts [20]. For the most part, future
management efforts are developed further through problem solving efforts before, during,
and after incidents to improve response efficiency [20].
2.0.1

Nationwide Implementation
As part of the FIRESCOPE program, the Incident Command System evolved

throughout the 1970s and was implemented as a stand-alone incident response system in
southern California in the 1980s [18]. Over time, the Incident Command System proved
its effectiveness in meeting the demands of each fire based incident with its uniquely
scaled organizational structure and facilitation of coordinated resources [21]. Due to the
association of wildland fire to urban fire at the Wildland Urban Interface, urban
firefighters have also been well aware of the Incident Command System since its
beginnings in the 70s. Furthermore, in the early 2000s, the Incident Command System
was extended nationwide when President George W. Bush signed Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), which called for a National Response Framework
(NRF) to create a uniform management system for all incidents (not just fire related)
under the National Incident Management System.
This national adoption of the Incident Command System relied heavily on
training and implementation of its ideal usage. As a result, study materials for the
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Incident Command System are readily available at the “Emergency Management
Institute” website [20], and in-person training programs exist that build upon these online
courses as trainees progress. The main facilitators of this training are the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the National Incident Management
System (NIMS) who provide the training documents.
National implementation of the Incident Command System has propelled it to
become the primary management system utilized within the entire spectrum of
emergency management. Therefore, benefits or relationships obtained through improved
usage of the Incident Command System for any application should be easily transferrable
between urban fire, wildland fire, and other fields of emergency management. It is stated
clearly in all training materials and relevant literature that when the Incident Command
System framework is used on a day to day basis for each incident, that learning of the
process lends it the capability to be effective in providing a stable and scalable
framework for all types of incidents [18] [20]. This characteristic of the Incident
Command System coupled with its applicability amongst many emergency management
systems provides for a flexible approach towards analysis of its characteristics.
2.0.2

United States Coast Guard Application
It’s worth noting various successful applications of the Incident Command

System that exist within emergency management services such as the United States Coast
Guard (USCG). Like fire services, the U.S. Coast Guard is tasked with protecting the
lives of many Americans. The Coast Guard primarily performs seafaring duties to ensure
the safety and security of the nation’s coastlines from various threats. The Coast Guard’s
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focus on public safety means it was impacted by the signing of Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 5 to implement the Incident Command System framework in 2005.
While implementing the Incident Command System, the U.S. Coast Guard
developed and published their own issue of an Incident Management Handbook which
states in the opening section that, “during Incident Management Handbook development,
it was recognized that 80% of response operations share common principles and
procedures…the other 20% are unique to the incident” [22]. This statement lends great
credibility to the implementation of the Incident Command System to bring some level of
stability and clarity to what is often considered highly variable and chaotic working
conditions. The realization that 80 percent of response efforts are similar implies that
there is a basis of repeatability in their processes. This repeatability can be documented
and improved similarly to how stable processes are improved within a Lean system. In
support of this statement, the handbook also directs members of the Coast Guard to
where they can access multiple job aids that have been developed and supplied for each
standard role within the organization [22].
The Coast Guard is well known for outstanding work within emergency response
as well as search and rescue operations even before adoption of the Incident Command
System, and examples of this are easily available for illustration of this fact [23].
However, while the best efforts are exerted by all responders within emergency
management, the occurrence of more severe incidents may lead to an influx of people
affected by that incident to require hospital treatment. This is where the Hospital
Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS) comes into play.
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2.0.3

Healthcare Application
Within the healthcare community the concept of “pre-hospital emergency

management” encompasses any or all incidents that are managed by other emergency
response agencies that may increase demands on hospitals as well as incidents that
involve the hospital directly [24] [25]. The Hospital Emergency Incident Command
System is based on the original “FIRESCOPE ICS” [24] and gives an excellent platform
for hospital based incident management due to its flexibility and coordination to
“function as the ‘central nervous system’ in directing all response activities” [24]. The
HEICS is also evolving within the healthcare industry to standardize response to new
issues that have appeared over the years such as pandemics due to infectious disease and
consideration of the mental effects associated with large incidents on all persons,
including responders and medical staff members [25].
As can easily be seen from these examples, application of the Incident Command
System amongst all response agencies as well as healthcare has the capability to provide
a coordinated effort to helping victims of incidents from the beginning of an incident
throughout their recovery. This speaks volumes of the flexibility and adaptability of the
Incident Command System. However, it must be noted that the fire services in the United
States have been using the Incident Command System since the very beginning of its
development. So, for the purposes of this thesis, applications of the Incident Command
System within the firefighting community will be the primary subject when analyzing
capabilities of applying Lean manufacturing principles and practices. Those principles
and practices will be introduced and discussed in the following sections.
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2.1

The Toyota Production System
The Toyota Production System was developed in response to lessons learned

during past experiences, and thus, shares similar background with the development of the
Incident Command System. The development and spread of Toyota Production System
principles can be seen in the following timeline of Figure 9.

Figure 9: Timeline depicting the history of the Toyota Production System.
The tough economic climate of post-World War II Japan led Japanese manufacturing
companies to fight for their very survival. In 1950, American scientist and statistician W.
Edwards Deming traveled to Japan to assist post-war recovery efforts. Deming
introduced Japanese officials to the concept of statistical quality control [26] and the idea
that focusing on “built-in” quality rather than inspection could increase the quality of
products or services without increasing costs [27]. Deming also introduced the Japanese
to the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) learning cycle (shown in Figure 10), as well as his
“14 Principles of Management” [27], both of which serve as the foundation for managing
the ability to achieve and sustain built-in quality.
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Figure 10: The Plan-Do-Check-Act learning cycle taught to Japanese industry by W.
Edwards Deming.

Eventually these ideas were embraced and successfully implemented into many Japanese
companies, including Toyota, who continued to apply them, eventually developing the
Toyota Production System (TPS or Lean manufacturing). The foundation of a Lean
system is standardization and revision of those standards through diligent problem
solving to resolve abnormalities, to reduce/eliminate waste, and to continuously improve
the system’s ability to provide products or services [28] [29].
2.1.1

Implementations in North America
The transition of the Toyota Production System from Japan to North America is

marked by a peak in interest by North American manufacturing companies after several
key occurrences over time. For example, in 1984, General Motors (GM) and Toyota
partnered together to open the New United Motor Manufacturing Incorporated (NUMMI)
plant, an endeavor in which Toyota contributed principles of their production system
towards operation during the joint venture [30]. The NUMMI plant was a second attempt
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at operations within a manufacturing facility in Fremont, California that had been shut
down and considered to be a lost opportunity [30]. Although the issues of productivity,
quality, and low employee morale plagued the former GM-Fremont plant before the
partnership, Toyota pushed to re-hire all former employees and maintain union contracts
with each employee to produce vehicles [30]. The NUMMI plant experienced better
worker morale, and in turn improved quality and productivity issues due to the people
oriented philosophy of the Toyota Production System [31]. A philosophy in which they
respected the worker and allowed them to stop the line and question possible defects and
abnormalities of their processes [31].
The 1987 opening of Toyota Motor Manufacturing Kentucky (TMMK) in
Georgetown, Kentucky marked the first major production facility in North American and
was Toyota’s first venture into the U.S. market on their own. TMMK remains as the
largest Toyota plant in the U.S. and since opening, the company has opened plants in
Indiana, Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, and West Virginia.
Later, in 1991, the term “Lean manufacturing” first appeared in a book titled “The
Machine that Changed the World” [32]. This book is based on research conducted at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) regarding the development and inner
workings of the Toyota Production System [32]. This exposure to Toyota’s continuous
improvement efforts led many people within the manufacturing industry to take notice.
As it stands today, the Toyota Production System places a great deal of
importance on “providing products and services with craftsmanship, pride, zeal, history,
spirit, joy, and more” [29]. The company strives to promote lifelong learning in its
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employees to produce well-rounded professionals; this effort intends to develop
employees who possess not only well-developed specialized technical skills but also
overall knowledge and keen interest in continuously improving their work [33].
Fujio Cho is well known as a visionary with respect to Toyota and the Toyota
Production System. It is well documented that Mr. Cho focused on building consensus,
and developing people based on their skills as well as their particular interests. Mr. Cho’s
philosophy is summarized in the following statements collaborated from various sources:
“A company must provide service to society, and the way a company must go
about that is to produce good products honestly and consistently without
compromise [29], offering service-oriented concepts to create a highly effective
and efficient modern system consisting of people, information, machine and
material” [33] [34].
It was this drive to provide service to society that promoted Mr. Cho to play a large role
in the development of the University of Kentucky’s Lean Systems Program.
2.1.2

The University of Kentucky’s Lean System Program
The success of the Toyota Production System and several attempts to understand

its inner workings by competitors and researchers alike prompted Mr. Cho’s vision to
promote a partnership between Toyota and the University of Kentucky in 1994. The
University of Kentucky was chosen due to its close proximity to Toyota Motor
Manufacturing Kentucky, as well as its excellent curricula regarding Science,
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM). Therefore, apart from actual Toyota
experience, the University of Kentucky’s Lean Systems Program (UK-LSP) is the closest
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resource available for deeper understanding of Lean manufacturing. The Lean Systems
Program provides a variety of courses on Lean manufacturing principles and practices
created through 20 years of close collaboration with Toyota. During this time, the
program has served more than 20,000 people from different types of organizations
including manufacturing, food service industry, healthcare and public services, as well as
education.
To maintain congruence with the Toyota Production System at its source, the UK
Lean Systems Program operates from a pool of retired Toyota employees from various
levels within the organization who teach Lean manufacturing principles as they have
learned them during their time within Toyota. Furthermore, the Lean systems Program
houses a current Toyota executive who serves in residence with the Lean Systems
Program for a 2 year period. This opportunity gives the executive valuable practice in
applications of Toyota Production System principles across a broader audience to include
clients not affiliated with Toyota. Exposure to an academic environment also promotes
Mr. Cho’s vision of developing the academic understanding of the Toyota Production
System. Furthermore, the executive in residence helps to promote continuous
improvement within the Lean Systems Program itself through application of Toyota
Production System principles towards the program’s processes, functions, and goals.
After the executive’s two year term is done, another executive, possibly from a
significantly different area of management within Toyota, will rotate in providing further
development. This provides many perspectives on the product provided by the Lean
Systems Program.
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The value added by the UK Lean Systems Program can be seen when reviewing
their standard definition of what Lean should mean to an organization. The Lean Systems
Program’s definition of “True Lean” is meticulously crafted and more clearly illustrated
as the breakdown of the following 5 points:
1. The group by themselves,
2. use systematic problem solving,
3. to improve the work they do,
4. towards achievement of the company’s targets and goals,
5. when and only when the company culture is the reason the improvement occurs.
‒ The Definition of “True Lean” [28].
Each point of this definition holds a certain principle of TPS. The opening point
focuses on the people doing the work. This intentional placement of putting them first in
the definition of “True Lean” symbolizes their importance in the system. The second
point states that there exists a method of problem solving used systematically throughout
the organization. The third point stresses the focus on continuous improvement but only
within the work that one is responsible for, not in other sections outside of their control.
The fourth and fifth points outline that the company’s culture is what drives the system
towards achieving the measurable targets and goals set by the company. These last two
points also allude to a capability of assessing performance within the system by
communicating it effectively to the workers, as well as upper level management, to
stimulate the improvement process and ensure value added improvements. This is
achieved through effective development and visualization of Key Performance Indicators
(KPI) encompassing the company’s targets and goals. Effective usage of Key
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Performance Indicators can allow users of the system to quickly and efficiently identify
gaps for improvement. The approach for organizational transformation at the University
of Kentucky’s Lean Systems Program is unique, and this definition illustrates the overall
intention to reach beyond common misconceptions of what practicing Lean
manufacturing means in any setting. That is, rather than focusing specifically on tools or
an ability to save costs, the program develops curriculum that brings about consideration
of society, company culture, industrial psychology, principles of organizational learning,
and respect for people to the forefront of Lean transformation.
2.1.3

Lean Healthcare and Non-Manufacturing Applications
Healthcare organizations have had some success implementing Lean principles

and practices to enable and sustain continuous improvements. Graban [35] discussed that
various hospitals have been able to reduce operational considerations through Lean
principles and practices. This was evident in reductions related to the time it takes for lab
results to be processed, decontamination time for instrumentation, and other aspects that
reflect negatively on patient satisfaction (blood based infections due to intravenous
devices, patient wait time, or the patient’s length of stay). Graban also notes:
“With advances and systematic improvements in aviation safety, passengers in the
general public take it for granted that they will arrive safely at their destination;
we should hope for similar advances in healthcare so patients can take it for
granted that they will not be harmed in hospitals” [35].
This perspective is one that drives the incorporation of Lean in healthcare and illustrates
implementation into another industry, aviation safety.
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The aviation safety industry has been fairly successful in its transformation to
Lean manufacturing. The Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) industry is defined
as the industry responsible for maintenance and restoration of active aircraft functioning
at an airline so they maintain safe performance of their intended functions [36]. These
organizations have benefitted from the implementation of Total Productive Maintenance
(TPM) as well as other Lean principles to improve their efficiency and eliminate waste
[36]. The successful applications seem to be prominent for large aircraft MROs, and
some struggles have been encountered when applying Lean to organizations that deal
more particularly with small aircraft due to limited resources and low volume [37].
More towards the business aspects that Lean can be useful for, it must be noted
that the well-known and highly sought after 8 step problem solving process that is used
within Toyota is simply referred to as the “Toyota Business Practice” [38]. This method
is not only used for solving problems at the production floor, but is used for improving
processes in other aspects of the organization such as the Human Resources department,
Accounting and Finance functions, and the management of hiring and training new
employees [28] [38]. This isn’t to say that the 8 step problem solving method can be used
standalone within these departments, but indicates that it is only part of a larger
management directive inherent to the Toyota Production System. The focus on Deming’s
Plan-Do-Check-Act learning cycle encourages the entire management of the system and
the problem solving process follows this cycle strictly as well.
The idea that the Toyota Production system is applicable in all management
spectrums is also supported by a comment in Phillip Marksbury’s book “The Modern
Theory of the Toyota Production System.” Marksbury states that the Toyota Production
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System may better be described as the “Toyota Management System” to avoid much
confusion [39].
These factors illustrate the Toyota Production System’s capability and flexibility
to be applied in any management setting. This is rooted deeply in the Toyota Production
System’s goal to provide quality to the customer, where customer can be defined as the
next receiving process in the overall production of a product or service, as well as the
final customer who receives the final product or service [28] [29].
2.2

Organizational Learning Theory
System such as the Incident Command System and those who use it must

continuously improve response efforts, and Organizational Learning plays a key role in
that effort. The dynamic Incident Command System meets its goals through a best
practices type of approach, which relies heavily on its ability to learn from previous
incidents [14]. This indicates that learning occurs not only on an individual basis, but also
at an organizational level [40]. The application of Lean principles and practices have
been shown to greatly increase individual learning, and by extension, organizational
learning [41]. Because of this, Toyota has been called “the gold standard” of learning
organizations [16]. The Plan-Do-Check-Act learning cycle encourages the continuous
improvement typical of learning systems because of its reliance on timely operational
information feedback [15] [42] [43] [44]. Operational feedback relies on how well a
system is defined and understood by its users in order to identify problems and resolve
them quickly. This leads neatly into Chapter 3, where investigation into the systems
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serves to promote an encouraging discussion of similarities alongside illustration of gaps
between Lean and the Incident Command System.
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CHAPTER 3: DISCUSSION
3.0

Systematic Comparison
The need to develop an ever-increasingly effective learning organization provides

a common goal for both Lean manufacturing and Incident Command System
applications. This indicates that the Incident Command System could benefit in its efforts
for continuous improvement by adopting Lean principles. To support this claim,
fundamental principles that govern the Incident Command System, as well as its key
functions and components, needed to be examined closely for comparison. Figure 11
provides an overall comparison of the organizational structures for discussion.
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Figure 11:
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Figure 11: Standardized structure and roles within Lean manufacturing (Left) [28] and the Incident Command
System (Right) [20]. Illustrates span of control, communication flowing in both directions, and coordination taking
place between supervisors of each group in both systems. The diagonal (dash-dot-dot) arrows illustrate improper
communication within these systems. Listed to the left, the Lean structure clearly associates each role with certain
responsibilities [28]. This is a partial representation of either system’s entire structural hierarchy for descriptive
purposes only. Given the Incident Command System’s dynamic nature, the dashed boxes illustrate required roles to
initiate formation of the structure [20].

The comparison shown in Figure 11 illustrates organizational structures and
direction of flow for communication in both Lean manufacturing and the Incident
Command System. Well defined span of control, roles, responsibilities, and
communication are key components in the success of both systems.
3.0.1

Standardized Structure and Roles
Figure 11 illustrates that the functional groupings within an Incident Command

System’s response framework are typically comprised of 3 to 7 individuals per supervisor
[20]. Similarly, in a Lean system the same type of control span is employed for Team
Leaders to have around 4 to 6 Team Members reporting to them. This limitation provides
ease of management within a system without underwhelming or overburdening
management, and gives more clarity to role definition and individual contributions [45].
The organizational structure of Figure 11 for a Lean system depicts roles that are
intended to guide workers who perform the same job or work rotations every day. In
contrast, the Incident Command System’s organizational structure is extremely flexible to
compensate for high variability in the demand of resources for each incident. In either
case, the existence of some standard roles within each structure provides stability.
The Incident Command System’s structure typically begins with one small group
of responders at the resource level, which is illustrated by the dashed box in Figure 11.
From there the situation is assessed and a decision is made. The determination of whether
more resources are needed, as dictated by the incident, prompts the structure to expand
into the hierarchy shown in Figure 11 [20]. The Incident Commander (IC) role, shown
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highest in the hierarchy, is a critical role assuming responsibility for management of the
incident. While the incident is small with respect to the number of people responding, the
Incident Commander role may be filled by the leader of the first responding resource; if
the incident does not escalate, this person may remain solely responsible for all aspects of
management [20]. However, as the incident escalates, more resources are required to
assist in incident management. If the number of people that the Incident Commander is
directly responsible for (span of control) is exceeded, various section chiefs may be
“activated” by assigning qualified personnel to the role in order to distribute the work and
maintain appropriate span of control [20]. Otherwise, if the incident becomes
significantly more difficult to manage, the role of Incident Commander is transferrable to
an individual who has more experience with larger incidents or more specific incidents
such as wildland fire or the presence of hazardous materials at the incident [20].
Each section chief assumes responsibility for managing some aspect of response
whether it be within an Operations, Planning, Logistics, Finance, or Intelligence section
of the framework [20]. The section chiefs will act within their scope of responsibility and
report back to the IC periodically [20]. The Operations Section Chief and roles assigned
within it are illustrated in Figure 11. However, due to the inherent nature of
understanding incidents and determining approaches to resolving them, the Planning
Section Chief is one of the first roles activated within the organizational framework to
guide operations [46]. It must be noted that Planning, Logistics, Finance, and Intelligence
sections have different role assignments under them, and for simplicity these are not
illustrated in Figure 11 [20].
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Various definitions for specific groupings exists to distinguish different modules
of the Incident Command System’s organizational framework. For example, under the
Operations Section Chief, different “Branches” are groups working on the same fire with
each branch providing a specific service (e.g. suppression, search and rescue, medical
services) to contribute towards controlling the incident and protecting the population
[20]. Under any given Branch, the term “Division” or “Group” is used to define how a set
of resources is contributing to an incident.
Divisions may be comprised of similar or different types of resources with the
main distinguishing characteristic being the geographical location of their operations (e.g.
interior/exterior of a building fire, or north, south, east, west side of a large wildland
incident) [20]. Under a Division, the term “Strike Team” or “Task Force” is used to
distinguish how working teams are comprised. Strike Teams would have similar
resources to contribute to an incident (two hose trucks), while Task Forces would be
comprised of mixed types of resources (hose truck/ladder truck) [20]. Further, a “Group”
consists of functionally similar types of resources working on the incident within a
Division [20].
This design for an expanding framework is unique to the Incident Command
System. However, a similar level of flexibility is exhibited by the Toyota Production
System in its organizational design. The organizational structure of a Lean system is
based on providing support to frontline production Team Members, and a good example
of this can be seen in problem solving. Problems are addressed directly at the process
from a point of occurrence by a Team Leader, and upon escalation they are
communicated to higher levels of a Lean organization [28]. This allows problems to be
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resolved at the appropriate level using the right amount of effort at the right time to
accomplish the task.
This type of clarity with respect to role definition provides responders with the
ability to function in a stable framework while communicating quickly and efficiently
between various functional modules during the midst of an incident. To facilitate usage of
this structure, the situation must be understood and planning must take place to expand or
reduce resources used in the incident appropriately.
3.0.2

Planning and Communication
The planning process that takes place within an Incident Command System

environment is known as “The Planning P” [47], and this method is geared towards
changing the purely reactive mode of initial response into a more proactive mode of
gaining control or reducing an incident [20]. Similar to how an Operations Section Chief
is activated in Figure 11, a dedicated Planning Section Chief could be activated and focus
primarily on the planning process. Their main goal would be to coordinate with other
Section Chiefs (Operations, Logistics, Finance, and Intelligence) to collaborate goals into
an Incident Action Plan (IAP) for the incident [20] [47].
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(Planning P from training.fema.gov – PlanningP.pdf)
Figure 12: Illustration of "The Planning P" planning process of the Incident Command
System. Shows the planning process as a cycle that occurs after initial response takes
place [47]. This cycle is representative of one operational period where meetings take
place to develop, update, and revise the Incident Action Plan. The cycle also resembles a
PDCA cycle.

The Planning P shown in Figure 12, illustrates the meetings required between
various section chiefs to share information throughout the organization. Therefore, it can
be inferred from previous discussion of roles that, if the incident does not warrant section
chief activation, this would be manageable by the Incident Commander. This is because
coordination of efforts will be less complex, and development of the Incident Action Plan
may require fewer meetings or steps of the cycle. Most importantly, this cyclical method
of planning and coordination represents a learning phase similar to the Plan-Do-CheckAct learning cycle which is inherent to the Incident Command System overall. This
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planning method plays a significant role in the expansion and reduction of operational
resources [46] as well as the problem solving process which is addressed later in this
chapter. For more information please refer to “The Planning Process” document found in
Appendix A.
The desire for two-way communication represented in Figure 11 for both systems
indicates that information should come from the top down as well as from the bottom to
the top. This is logical given that the current condition should affect decision making in
both systems. Furthermore, collaboration amongst certain adjacent roles in Figure 11 is
highly encouraged in each system where applicable. For instance, in a Lean system,
Team Leaders from different work groups would collaborate to resolve issues that their
respective Team Members are dealing with (e.g. receiving defects from a previous
process) instead of team members themselves as they are busy with their work [28].
Similarly, in the fire services, any issues across different groups would be communicated
through respective supervisors in the system to resolve the situation. In order for this
communication to be efficient the corresponding roles must be accompanied by some
method of informing personnel of their responsibilities.
3.0.3

Standard Responsibilities and Documents
In Lean systems, Standardized Work (STW) is developed and maintained,

preferably by the Team Leader, to promote stability while providing opportunities to
define and eliminate abnormal conditions that burden the workers [28]. As previously
mentioned, the tasks of the frontline production members in a manufacturing
environment often contain low variability. Standardized Work Charts such as shown in
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Figure 13 are appropriately rigid for this. Standardized Work Charts display the time
required to complete work in order to meet customer demand (often referred to as “Takt
Time”) as well as the elemental work method and standard amount of work in process for
the worker to complete their tasks [28].
An abnormality or abnormal condition is typically understood to be present when
a worker has to adjust their normal method of work to avoid a problem, has to stop their
work, or has to do something that isn’t described in the Standardized Work Chart for
his/her work station. This type of struggle is clear to the worker who is experiencing it,
but only if the standards for that process are well defined and followed. This awareness
gives the Team Member an opportunity to stop the line or call for help to remedy any
abnormalities. Also, Standardized Work Charts are intended to be displayed where they
are easily viewed by the Team Leaders, Group Leaders, and higher levels of the
organization [28]. This provides quick assessment of current conditions to show how well
the Team Member is able to keep pace with production, while also providing an
opportunity to observe any abnormalities that are occurring. This visibility along with
regular Team Leader assessment provides the ability for the system to react faster and
resolve abnormalities more efficiently to regain normal working conditions.
The two following figures are displayed to illustrate the Standardized Work Chart
(Figure 13) as well as the supporting Standard Work Element Sheet (Figure 14). These
documents are present within the laboratory function of the University of Kentucky Lean
Systems Program to instruct trainees on Standardized Work. This laboratory strives to
simulate a production environment progressing through various defined stages in Lean
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manufacturing development in order to allow trainees with an opportunity to use tools
associated. These documents represent an assembly function within that environment.

Figure 13: Standardized Work Chart depicting work methods, Takt time, and Standard
Work in Process required for completing one cycle of work towards production of a
product. Visual representation of work layout depicted with numbers correspond to steps
in the work method. This provides a stable repeatable starting point for work each time.
However, the standard layout must be sustained for this tool to be effective [28].
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Figure 14: The Standard Work Element Sheet illustrates each step of the work method
described in the Standardized Work Chart and provides further information regarding
key points how as well as reasons why something is done. For this example, visual
symbols (cross, diamond, or inverted triangle) indicate steps in the method where safety
may be of concern, where quality needs to be checked, or where a step is critical for
meeting the specifications of the product during the production process [28].
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Standardized Work Charts are often supported by Standard Work Element Sheets
(SWES) illustrated in Figure 14, which breaks down more complicated work elements to
describe how they are done and provides clear visuals alongside key points as to why
they are done [28] [48]. It can be seen by the revision dates of these documents that the
Standard Work Element Sheet has been revised more recently than the Standardized
Work Chart. This reveals an important relationship between these two documents as well
as continuous improvement in general. The Standardized Work Chart is comprised of
broad steps showing an overall method for assessment while the Standard Work Element
Sheet provides the details of those steps for in depth understanding. Hence, changes that
occur in smaller increments are preferable to larger changes because they generally won’t
change the overall work being done, but will affect details and understanding of how part
of the work is done. These changes would improve detailed aspects of the methods
outlined in Standardized Work Charts without drastically affecting the Team Member
performing the work. When a large number of minor changes have accumulated
regarding the details of work, then the overall method may be revised to reflect the
current condition and new work method.
This stability reduces the need for constant in depth training on a process with
experienced workers, because the method remains largely familiar to the worker.
Exceptions to this occur when equipment, product design, or quality requirements
change, but overall, it is desired to have a good stable process that’s well documented and
built from the best method available [28] [48]. This gives way for good results in a Lean
system based on the idea that a good process will produce good results and that
improvement of that process will improve results further [28].
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The decision based work content performed by members of higher levels within a
Lean organization effectively limits the application of these approaches towards
standardizing their processes. For these instances, Standardized Procedures may be
developed with less strict adherence to exact step by step methods and intended to serve
as a general guideline [48]. This can provide stability regarding how to approach
situations, keep the individual focused on what to look for in a given situation, and ensure
that the person knows how often the situation should be reassessed [49]. A simple
example of this type of work is a general production maintenance scenario represented in
Figure 15.

Figure 15: Simple scenario of production maintenance [50].

In this scenario, the individual performing maintenance checks has 5 machines to
consider. The figure illustrates that at the fourth machine there are four things to consider,
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this machine may have components to inspect, gauges to read, or other regular
preventative maintenance tasks. Having this checklist of things to take into consideration
allows the worker to approach the work the same way each time. Also it’s easily apparent
from clear diagrams such as Figure 15, that the third item to investigate is somewhat
obscured. Having some record of what to check when investigating a machine can
provide the ability to ensure all tasks are accomplished, but also provides a baseline of
stability which can be improved upon. In this case, the third item on the checklist could
be moved or improved to provide a quick visual without having to go behind the fourth
item for access.
The overall goal for decision based standards are the same as with Standardized
Work Charts and Standard Work Element Sheets. This is to focus on the process,
stabilize it, standardize it, and look for future improvements to ensure incrementally
better results. However, it can be seen that the level of rigidity presented in the
Standardized Work documents of Figure 13 and Figure 14 would be restrictive to
firefighters and most likely impossible to maintain due to high fluctuations in work
content and time.
Methods for production maintenance bear striking similarities to how the fire
services approach assessing a situation. For example, a standard method for assessing
problems with a machine may be the inspection of products being made by the machine,
as particular defects may indicate problems with specific components of the machine.
Production maintenance also utilizes oil sampling in order to better understand machine
conditions that may be present when oil is dirty, burnt, or contains shards of metal [50].
Similarly, in the fire services smoke reading is practiced in order to predict the location of
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a fire within a building as well as the severity of a fire based on the smoke’s color,
density, velocity, and turbulence [51]. This technique can provide first responders with
vital warning signs to avoid possibly dangerous situations. These approaches provide
quick and immediate feedback about a situation and are practiced mainly because of the
brevity and accuracy by which a person can assess a situation to discover the main cause
of a problem.
Methods of standardizing the overall response efforts of fire services may come in
the form of regulations or codes proposed by local, state, or federal entities as discussed
in the Introduction. These typically result from a legislative process, and tend to work
towards improving aspects of safety and performance. For example, the Code of Federal
Regulations requires that firefighters use Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) for
respiratory health during incident response. While regulations tend towards general
improvement, they take time to complete from the standpoint of identifying a problem
and then going through necessary channels to resolve it, therefore a time lag exists before
regulations and codes are implemented that could improve day to day operations.
However, the amount of these regulations, codes, and legislative entities are numerous
for firefighters. Naturally, some baseline of stability is critical to reducing the complexity
placed upon firefighters in their duties.
The fire response community strives towards process control throughout the
entirety of response from the sizing up of an incident to the determination of when an
incident is under control. These methods are generally referred to as Standard Operating
Procedures (SOP), or similarly Standard Operating Guidelines (SOG), the latter being
used to counter any misconceptions that two unique incidents should be handled exactly
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the same. These procedures are developed by each department to incorporate regulatory
standards ensuring compliance [14]. Furthermore, departments are not limited in their
capability to adjust Standard Operating Procedures for improving past regulations in
order to meet department specific goals or to build upon “consensus standards” [51],
which may be unrelated to regulations but understood to be best practices learned from
past incidents.
3.0.4

Examples of Standard Operating Procedures in Fire Services
Standard Operating Procedures in the fire services are critical to keeping

responders on the same page to bring some form of repeatability and a proactive mindset
to an occupation that deals with highly variable and reactive situations. Numerous
Standard Operating Procedures are developed within each fire department, and some
even address how to implement and follow the framework of the Incident Command
System. There are some which incorporate federal requirements, such as the
aforementioned required usage of SCBA and the exposure limits for toxins emitted from
combustion. While others improve upon the overall body of knowledge related to
regulations, for example, outlining best practices for the usage of SCBA under heavy
operations. Other Standard Operating Procedures may provide guidance on operational
tasks, such as approaching and sizing up an incident, or keeping accountability of
personnel while inside structures during incidents [51].
The Standard Operating Procedure that’s typically used for the initial response of
an incident exists to provide a repeatable look at an incident, such as a multiple story
building on fire. During the approach and size-up of an incident, departments position the
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Engine truck with the hose for suppression forward of the building for two reasons: they
are able to view multiple sides of the building on approach for size up of the incident, and
they save room at the front of the building for a Ladder truck to access the building [51].
Alongside this, departments designate sides of the building with letters or numbers for
clear communication; these are illustrated in Figure 16 and Figure 17.

Figure 16: Top-Down Illustration of building face designation during the size-up of an
incident. Illustrates the approach of resources during incident command. Street facing
side is labeled A or “Address Side” while other faces are labeled B, C, and D in a
clockwise fashion. Engine crew sizes up the situation after seeing sides D, A, B and
positions itself just past the incident to leave room for the Ladder crew [51].
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Figure 17: Side Illustration of building face designation during size-up of an incident.
Each level is designated by a number or simply referred to as first, second, or third floor.
This designation along with the designation of the sides of the building give clarity to
communication. The point 3AB serves as an example of how a specific corner of the
building can be communicated briefly and efficiently using this method and other similar
methods for designation.

The figures illustrate the faces and stories of a building being designated by the
convention called for in a Standard Operating Procedure. As can be seen in Figure 17,
multi-story buildings can add some complexity to the designation of building areas.
Building designation allows for clear consistent communication for resources responding
to an incident no matter which department they arrived from, and gives better visibility
on where things are happening within the incident as well. For example, if a distress call
comes over the radio from a firefighter in 3AB, then it is clear that the firefighter is on
the third floor in the corner where faces A and B meet, as illustrated in Figure 17.
From an industrial engineering standpoint, these standards in place provide good
process control. During the process of response, the repeated actions called for in this
standard allows for approaching and sizing up of an incident relatively the same way each
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time even if the incident differs. Having seen up to 3/4 of the building or incident in
question, the firefighter is more knowledgeable about the current condition, allowing
them to make more informed decisions. Furthermore, in the case of a uniquely designed
building (L-shaped or multiple subterranean levels) or a fence blocking visibility, then
the firefighter will know of areas to be wary of and further investigation can be done
[51].
There is also a strong need for stability in keeping track of which firefighters are
actually inside buildings fighting fires. Therefore, an Accountability Standard Operating
Procedure exists for the tracking of personnel within a structure during a fire. The role of
the Accountability Officer is filled by personnel as called for within the Standard
Operating Procedure. The accountability officer’s role includes the collection and
tracking of firefighters’ Personal Accountability Safety System (PASS) devices before
they enter the building to perform their duties [51]. Afterward, the accountability officer
will regularly conduct a Personnel Accountability Report (PAR) over the radio for all
personnel being tracked at some time intervals during an incident, complete with a 1
minute warning to let them know the call is coming [51]. If they receive no response
from any one individual during the Personal Accountability Report, a Rapid Intervention
Team (RIT) stands ready to rescue a possibly incapacitated firefighter [51]. This Standard
Operating Procedure illustrates a blending of the federal regulation mandating the use of
SCBA equipment and the learned best practices of firefighters understanding that the
equipment may be rated for a certain amount of operational time, but may not last exactly
that long due to heavy activity when used. Therefore, the intervals in which Personnel
Accountability Reports are done is normally timed such that the group is reminded of the
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time they have already spent working an incident and, at the same time, gives them an
awareness of the further capability of their SCBA gear [51].
This method illustrates a desire by users of the Incident Command System to
manage and maintain visibility of their responders, while also being able to visualize
abnormal conditions. This type of standard is reminiscent of the duties performed by
Team Leaders in a Lean system who track various Key Performance Indicators as well as
monitoring the work being done to maintain an awareness of the current condition
experienced by the frontline production Team Members.
3.1

Problem Solving
The ability to resolve abnormalities based on current factual cues from the system

is important in the overall landscape of continuous improvement. In a production
environment, even attempting to define a problem can be a daunting task if one is using
old data or searching through a large batch of products to find the cause of defects [52].
Therefore, real time detection of defects and occurrences is important, and these events
should be broken down, categorized, and visualized clearly for prioritization of a problem
which can be resolved to positively affect progress towards the company’s targets and
goals. The following sections are dedicated to problem solving of abnormalities and the
ability to find solutions that prevent the problem from recurring.
3.1.1

Systematic Problem Solving
Figure 18 depicts the 8 step problem solving process found in Lean manufacturing

alongside the Incident Command System problem solving method with its 5 steps as
proposed by IS-241b from the Emergency Management Institute’s training documents
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[20]. The Incident Command System’s process for solving problems seems to share the
same foundation of the Plan-Do-Check-Act learning cycle introduced to Japanese
industry by Deming. Therefore, both processes show each step aligning to an aspect of
the Plan-Do-Check-Act (illustrated P, D, C, or A) process. Differences between the two
methods appear in the incompleteness of the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle in the Incident
Command System, which indicates the system lacks the drive for standardizing
successful results. A difference also appears in one key aspect promoted by Lean problem
solving, the focus on root cause analysis to reduce problem recurrence.
It can be seen in the steps illustrated by the figure that a high emphasis is placed
on planning within both problem solving methods during the initial stage of investigation
to better understand a problem and develop effective solutions. Furthermore, both of the
methods are cyclical, as monitoring the situation or process being addressed ties back to
the first step of identifying or clarifying the next problem to purpose.
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Figure 18:
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Figure 18: Comparison of Problem Solving Methods used in Lean manufacturing (Left) [28] and the Incident Command System
(Right) [20]. The eight-step problem solving method used systematically within Lean organizations emphasizes root cause
analysis and standardization of successful implementations [28]. This cycle not only encourages the system to find a problem and
fix a problem, but helps ensure that the problem never returns. The five-step problem solving method discussed in IS-241b
training documents does not emphasize root cause analysis or standardization of successful results [20]. This indicates that when
the system finds a problem and fixes it, that it cannot be ensured that the problem will never return.

The Incident Command System’s problem solving method is illustrated on the
right side of Figure 18. Due to its usage in high stress, high urgency environments, the
method promotes various supporting materials in the form of questionnaires or checklists
that guide the user towards clarifying, breaking down, and setting goals for problems
quickly during an incident. The questionnaire associated with the first step provokes the
user to think critically about how to identify, define, and analyze the problem [20]. Step 2
encourages brainstorming, surveys, and discussion groups; this step is supported by a list
of questions one should ask themselves regarding various alternatives: constraints,
appropriateness, adequacy, effectiveness, efficiency, and side effects [20].
The development of countermeasures follows in the third step with an exercise of
listing out all alternatives and writing their degree of limitation in terms of political,
safety, financial, environmental, ethical, and other factors [20]. Once a countermeasure is
decided on, a 9 point checklist is used in Step 4 to fully describe the solution by outlining
targets, methods, resources, timeframe, and who is responsible [20]. Finally, the fifth step
involves monitoring progress to evaluate the results and is accompanied by a 6 point
checklist to assist with this task [20]. Refer to Appendix B for the complete job aid used
for this problem solving model containing all checklists and supplemental items.
The steps of the Lean manufacturing problem solving process is illustrated to the
left side of Figure 18, and follows the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle adamantly. The first
three steps of the Lean manufacturing process have the same goal as the Incident
Command System’s first two steps, but the planning phase continues into a fourth step
where root cause analysis is done.
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Properly breaking down the problem in step 2 along with performing root cause
analysis of step 4 are well-known struggle points within the 8 step process [28] [53]. This
is partly due to a learned tendency to commit to a solution for a problem without deeply
searching for the cause [28] [53]. Step 2 requires starting with a broad perspective of an
issue and narrowing down all contributions to find a unique problem to prioritize based
on severity or frequency of occurrence. If the problem breakdown is not done thoroughly,
the rest of the process is adversely affected until the breakdown is revisited and corrected
to go as deeply as necessary.
Analyzing the root cause is typically achieved in step 4 by asking “Why” multiple
times in relation to the target. The target is set in step 3 and based on the prioritized
problem found in step 2. This process drills even deeper to find the true cause of a
problem for elimination. Following the process thoroughly promotes the cycle illustrated
in the figure of finding and fixing a problem, where the addition of tracing it back to a
root cause and standardizing successful results will provide the opportunity to prevent
recurrence [28].
Towards the end of the planning phase of Plan-Do-Check-Act problem solving,
both systems move forward to develop, implement, and monitor countermeasures. The
absence of thorough root cause analysis in either method will lead to multiple iterations
of countermeasures based on trial and error until something works, where the true cause
of the problem may still be unresolved. Also important in the closing stages of problem
solving is the standardization of successful results. This step serves to communicate the
problem as well as the changes associated to those who will be affected by it, or those
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who can benefit from the knowledge. This sharing of information is important for
maintaining the level of organizational learning desired in any system.
Unsuccessful applications of Lean manufacturing typically result from an overemphasis on immediate improvement which often ignores the importance of thorough
problem solving and well maintained standardization [54]. The Incident Command
System’s training documents do not explicitly state standardization and incorporation as
part of the current best method, but these aspects are clearly required for continuous
improvement. Furthermore, resolving issues without finding the root cause will risk in
recurrence of problems. The Incident Command System’s process shown in Figure 18
encourages finding and fixing problems, but will not prevent recurrence unless problems
are traced back to the root cause and the results are incorporated into the standard
procedures of the Incident Command System.
3.1.2

Problem Recurrence and Continuous Improvement
Donahue and Tuohy [55] recognized recurrence of problems in their analysis of

learning capabilities within the Incident Command System. After careful review of post
incident reports, they concluded the need for the drive and ability to solve problems
permanently rather than suffer them repeatedly [55]. Moynihan [56] further explored the
concepts of organizational learning in the Incident Command System with regards to
learning that takes place during the management of an incident (intra-crisis learning) and
learning that takes place as reflection outside of an incident (inter-crisis learning).
Moynihan also noted that the development and revision process taking place during the

56

learning that occurs via reflection would effectively minimize the amount of learning
required during incidents [57].
The Incident Command System’s use of questionnaires, checklists, and other
materials are intended to direct problem solving while streamlining the decision making
process. Users of the 5 Step Problem solving process shown on the right of Figure 18
benefit from a fairly swift process to determine countermeasures during the midst of an
incident. However, it’s unknown to the author whether this 5 step method is also used
during reflection of an incident to develop countermeasures for systematic problems or
general instability within repeatable processes. The addition of root cause analysis and
standardization of successful results during reflection of an incident could provide an
opportunity for deeper understanding of what causes various recurring struggle points.
This type of deep investigation promotes an intuitive understanding of the processes in
question. In turn, this level of understanding increases the effectiveness of the documents
used for stability such as Lean Standardized Work documents or Firefighter Standard
Operating Procedures encouraging continuous improvement within the systems.
For a wildland fire environment, instabilities can be found even between the
groups of responders who work together to manage incidents. Incident Management
Teams could be dispatched from one wildland fire to the next to work with an entirely
different structure and circumvent the reflection process for an incident entirely [13]. The
most stable roles within wildland environments would be those that develop the Resource
Management Plans and Fire Management Plans. Those who develop these plans typically
have authority over incidents that occur in their area [13] and should have access to
information gathered during incident management. This information could be processed
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through the 8 step method to discover and eliminate root cause for revision and further
development of Resource Management Plans, Fire Management Plans, and other
standards to promote continuous improvement.
The importance of problems in any environment arises from the fact that they will
occur inevitably. The key approach used by Lean manufacturing methods is to develop a
system capable of communicating those problems or gaps in real time in order to use
them as an opportunity for improvement. This hinges on adherence to the Plan-DoCheck-Act learning cycle and the system’s ability to retain or spread information to
prevent problem recurrence.
The Lean approach to obtaining timely operational feedback for improvement is
based on system stability through the aforementioned standards for roles, responsibilities,
and methods. This level of definition within the system increases as these component are
improved through waste reduction and reduction of general confusion within the system.
A general illustration of the Continuous Improvement process is shown in Figure 19,
where improvement is shown as steps upward. These continuous improvement activities
not only benefits systems components but also work towards providing better definition
for the system itself.
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Figure 19: Continuous Improvement and stability in a system promote a decrease in the
time required for further improvements resulting from better definition of the system.

The clarity gained from improvements made in a stable and well-defined system
gives rise to the opportunity for more frequent continuous improvement activities
because of the ability to distinguish abnormal and normal conditions within the system.
This is only possible if the knowledge gained from improvement activities is retained and
understood throughout the organization.
Figure 20 demonstrates the cycle of continuously evaluating how effectively the
Incident Command System responds through each iteration of addressing incidents (Fires
1,2,3,…,n). The Incident Command System then uses this data from each incident to
improve the efficiency of response and goes on to repeat the process.
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Figure 20: Anticipated incremental improvements in TPS/Lean organizations versus
improvements in the Incident Command System. Based on Maginnis [41].

Figure 20 also illustrates an anticipated gap that occurs between systems applying
TPS/Lean methods and the Incident Command System without root cause analysis and
strict adherence to standardizing successful results [41].
3.1.3

Gap Analysis for Determining Needs
Gaps within the fire services are also explored by the National Fire Protection

Association through the “Needs Assessments for the U.S. Fire Services” report. The
Needs Assessment is published every 5 years since 2001 and composed with data from
the prior year. Each report provides comparisons to previous needs assessments. For
example, the 2011 assessment is compared with results of both reports published in 2001
and 2006 to illustrate improvements as well as remaining gaps to show needs of fire
services [4]. The intention of this report is to direct grant money to improve fire services
by comparing survey-based statistics to regulatory requirements within the following 6
core areas: personnel and capabilities, facilities and apparatus, personal protective
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equipment, fire prevention and code enforcement, ability to handle unusually challenging
incidents, and communications/new technology [4].
The categories in the report are separated into different sections to reflect needs
based on size of population protected. This stratification was shown necessary in the
report due to the trend that fire services protecting smaller communities generally display
greater needs since there are more departments covering smaller communities to be
surveyed [4]. Furthermore, the report is broken down to provide fact sheets and statistical
reports for each state in the United States [58]. Appendix C contains a portion of the
United States report, and the fact sheet for Kentucky from 2011 can be found in
Appendix D.
These reports discuss general improvements across the board for the United States
as a whole [4], and some improvement in certain areas for the state of Kentucky [58].
The percentage of estimated need for Self Contained Breathing Apparatus to outfit all
firefighters in departments across the nation, as well as in Kentucky, are illustrated in
Figure 21. This contribution towards a clear picture of fire services along with an
illustration of needs is admirable. This information is also key in preventing fire services
from suffering the consequences of outdated equipment, facilities, or a lack of written
agreements with coordinating agencies.
Figure 21 illustrates a particular result of the report regarding Self Contained
Breathing Apparatus needs for fire services in 2011. The figure is interpreted to read
“52% of the all fire departments cannot equip firefighters on a shift with self contained
breathing apparatus, down from 70% in 2001, and 60% in 2005” [4].
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Figure 21: Self Contained Breathing Apparatus needs in the United States fire services
(blue) [4] and Kentucky fire services (red) [58].

As encouraging as this communication of needs may be for stimulating
improvements, these statistics don’t seem to drill down past illustrating general gaps. It
would be interesting to see needs based directly on processes performed by fire services
in the United States. When looking at needs deeply from this process perspective, it
allows for the development of performance indicators that would affect these statistics in
real time. The needs would then be communicated and monitored at multiple levels
within the system allowing for maintenance of the current, clear information. Figure 22
illustrates a strictly theoretical example of Key Performance Indicators that could be
tracked to communicate the effects of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus equipment
upon three categories of performance within an organization.
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Figure 22: Theoretical hierarchy of Key Performance Indicators for Fire Services.

The three performance indicators shown in Figure 22, Safety, Quality, and Cost are based
on information tracked at the process and collaborated at the departmental level. This
information would then be communicated to the state level to be combined with data
from other departments to be shared at the federal level as a performance measure that
would indicate needs. The performance indicators displayed at the departmental level
would be regularly updated through documenting process abnormalities, tracking
response time, etc.
This effort would also encourage some level of activity at the departmental level
for improvement. Going deeper into these categories to better understand the reasoning
behind gaps may also provide insight into methods of reducing them without monetary
contributions as well.
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION
4.0

Conclusions
The robust learning cycle present within a successful Lean manufacturing

environment hinges on a Plan-Do-Check-Act process which facilitates continuous
improvement when followed rigorously. This is due to a deeper level of learning
achieved from investigations of root cause to eliminate problems [59]. In addition, Lean
systems retain and spread information regarding improvements throughout the system by
continual revision of standards and effective communication in response to problem
solving successes. This also serves to drive the system towards future efforts for
continuous improvement as goals have been effectively raised and set. The Incident
Command System attempts to follow the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle, but literature
indicates that the system struggles with problem recurrence; therefore application of root
cause analysis may be able to significantly contribute to the effectiveness of future
emergency responses. Furthermore, the Incident Command System’s training documents
regarding problem solving do not guide the user to post-problem solving efforts intended
to retain and spread knowledge throughout the system. This highlights an area where loss
of valuable incident based knowledge would occur, which could be remedied through
more diligent revision of standards.
The use of statistics to illustrate the needs of fire services within the Unites States
provides an opportunity to reduce those needs by sharing them. However, some
exploration of these needs at the process level would be useful in providing a better
overall picture of the system. The monitoring and maintenance of these performance
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indicators at various levels of the fire services would also facilitate continuous
improvement. This is because problem identification and prioritization are essentially
streamlined through access to the most current information. Finally, the application of
these key performance indicators in real time would provide an opportunity for more
frequent statistical analysis and reporting.
After analyzing the Incident Command System and Lean manufacturing to form
an overall understanding of both systems, it seems readily apparent that the application of
Lean methods would be extremely promising. Similarities between the two systems
indicate possibility for success, while the differences only imply opportunity.
4.1

Future Considerations
For the duration of this study, it was intended to understand the Incident

Command System and Lean manufacturing organizations better in order to consider the
Incident Command System from a Lean manufacturing perspective. This was done in
order to assess whether or not Lean could be applied to the Incident Command System.
Because of the encouraging similarities between the two systems discussed in this thesis,
future studies could be more focused towards application of the various tools sought out
by manufacturing professionals around the world. Some primary tools associated with
Lean manufacturing that could be implemented into any department to aid in preparation
for incident management would be 5S (Sort, Straighten, Shine, Standardize, and Sustain)
[60], Waste Elimination of the 7 critical wastes (Waiting, Overproduction, Rework,
Motion, Processing, Inventory, and Transportation) [60], and Visual Management of
results of these efforts.
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These principles are fairly straightforward, but require diligence to maintain
results and drive to improve further. Implementation of these tools would be most
successful within a “model area” of an organization rather than being deployed across the
entire framework [28]. This approach allows for better support towards the model area
during implementation, and results from this implementation can be used to lead by
example in order to spread throughout the organization. The development of a model area
also results in experienced members of the organization who understand the struggles of
implementing the new approach and can serve in a support function to other areas who
may be working towards implementing Lean principles as well.
Due to the various gaps discovered between these two systems. Future work could
serve to investigate the statistics published by the National Fire Protection Association, as
well as other entities, in order to better understand them. This would require an effort by
the investigator to track down comparisons of various levels of needs (expressions of no
need, some need, and critical need) discussed in the reports, discover what that need
physically looks like, and then compare and analyze the related effects of this need
realized at the fire departments level among various other perspectives. This could
culminate in a quantifiable indication of what is occurring at any one department directly
affecting the need expressed.
Furthermore, research into the development of Standard Operating Procedures
will need to be done. It would be particularly interesting to see direct comparison
between the production maintenance aspects of manufacturing and the Standard
Operating Procedures used within the fire services. Further, in this effort the researcher
would gain a basic understanding of how Standard Operating Procedures are developed,
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and then assess the revision of these documents. Most importantly, the number of
revisions along with the quality of revisions would give a good indication of how well the
system retains knowledge gained by incidents. This would also include assessing the
amount of rework done with revising a Standard Operating Procedure.
Critical future research is required as relates to the problem solving method used
within the fire services. It is of interest whether current or proposed methods are used
during an incident versus different methods that may be used after an incident. It may
take a great deal of effort to differentiate problem solving towards addressing an incident
to meet incident goals and the problem solving methods used to resolve systemic
abnormalities. Furthermore, some indication of the systematic utilization of the 5 step
problem solving method could be given through survey or consensus and compilation of
the results. However, the rewarding results of these efforts would be an idea of how
coordinated the problem solving approach is within the realm of fire management.
Systematically solving problems reduces the amount of in depth explanation required for
developed solutions because all personnel will “speak the same language” as far as the
discussion of their methods and line of thinking towards results.
Finally, many factors are understood to impact the use and effectiveness of the
Incident Command System regardless of system design itself. Moynihan [56] stated that
barriers to learning during a crisis may result from limited time, political consequence,
and weak working relationships between responders. As well, a recent comprehensive
literature review published by Jensen and Waugh [61] noted various factors regarding the
application of the Incident Command System’s procedures within various other
emergency response areas. In order to improve the system overall, it is important to
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maintain continuous improvement efforts within areas that do use the Incident Command
System regularly, such as the firefighting community. These efforts would result in a well
defined area of the system that demonstrates efficiency and effectiveness to lead by
example and encourage further integration as a unified response community.
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